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Pareto Improving Minimum Wage Laws

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  • Lang, Kevin

Abstract

By increasing the expected wage in low skill jobs, a minimum wage law can reduce the incentive for low skill workers to imitate high skill workers in the signaling process. The gain from reduced investment in the signal can more than offset the loss from unemployment among low skill workers so that total output increases. Moreover, with an appropriate poll tax on workers to compensate owners of capital, the law can make all workers and owners of capital better off. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.

Volume (Year): 25 (1987)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 145-58

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Handle: RePEc:oup:ecinqu:v:25:y:1987:i:1:p:145-58

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Cited by:
  1. Cousineau, Jean-Michel, 1991. "L’effet du salaire minimum sur le chômage des jeunes et des femmes au Québec : une réestimation et un réexamen de la question," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 67(2), pages 144-165, juin.
  2. David Lee & Emmanuel Saez, 2008. "Optimal Minimum Wage Policy in Competitive Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 14320, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Lee, David & Saez, Emmanuel, 2012. "Optimal minimum wage policy in competitive labor markets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 739-749.
  4. Kevin Lang, 1992. "Does the Human-Capital/Educational-Sorting Debate Matter for Development Policy?," NBER Working Papers 4052, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Flinn, Christopher, 2003. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search with Bargaining," IZA Discussion Papers 949, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Neumark, David & Wascher, William, 2001. "Minimum Wages and Training Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 563-95, July.
  7. Deltas, George, 2007. "Can a minimum wage increase employment and reduce prices in a neoclassical perfect information economy?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(6), pages 657-674, August.
  8. Fleck, Robert K., 2014. "Can prohibitions on “price gouging” reduce deadweight losses?," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 100-107.
  9. Tomer Blumkin & Leif Danziger, 2014. "Deserving Poor and the Desirability of Minimum Wage Rules," CESifo Working Paper Series 4721, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Luciano Fanti & Luca Gori, 2008. "‘Backyard’ technology and regulated wages in a neoclassical OLG growth model," Discussion Papers 2008/74, Dipartimento di Economia e Management (DEM), University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy.
  11. Lee, David & Saez, Emannuel, 2010. "Optimal Minimum Wage Policy in Competitive Labor Markets," Institute for Research on Labor and Employment, Working Paper Series qt07w2z7t6, Institute of Industrial Relations, UC Berkeley.
  12. repec:ese:iserwp:2004-18 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Robin Boadway & Nicolas Marceau, 1994. "Time inconsistency as a rationale for public unemployment insurance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 107-126, October.

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