This article focuses on the role of medical licensure in motivating physician service quality. It characterizes recent changes in health care markets as reducing the positive contribution of licensure to social welfare. These changes include increased hospital and health maintenance organization (HMO) liability, incentives to shift to for-profit provision of care, increased use of brand names, direct employment of physicians, and the establishment of national data banks that keep records of physicians' past performance Also, the article argues that recent and expected pressures on physician earnings reduce the incentive effects of existing state licensing arrangements. Copyright 1992 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 10 (1992) Issue (Month): 1 (January) Pages: 31-38 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:oup:coecpo:v:10:y:1992:i:1:p:31-38
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