Given the enlargement of the European Union, the fall-back in productivity growth and the lack of success in implementing further structural reforms, this special issue highlights the political economy in the European Union and discusses the role of the Maastricht Treaty as an impediment or a catalyst for reform. It also sheds light on the empirical characteristics of the voting behaviour of Members of the European Parliament and shows that they vote more along party lines than national lines and pays due attention to allegiance and party discipline. It offers a game-theoretic analysis of why the Lisbon Treaty will not strengthen the European Parliament versus the Council as much as expected and how the old bigger Member States strengthen their grip on the political decision-making process. There is discussion of the ratification of European legislation in the Member States. Finally, the crucial question of how European politics can be made more attractive is addressed. (JEL codes: F55, H11, P16) Copyright , Oxford University Press.
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