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Partnership Penalties and Bonuses Created by UK Welfare Programs

Author

Listed:
  • Dan Anderberg
  • Florence Kondylis
  • Ian Walker

Abstract

This article explores how the UK welfare benefit system subsidise or penalise couples for living together as partners. A couple is said to face a 'partnership bonus' ('penalty') if they can receive more (less) benefits when living as partners than when living separately. Using data on existing couples from the Family Resources Survey 1995-2004 we provide a description of the distribution of partnership penalties and bonuses in the population. We also find that, while the 1999 Working Families' Tax Credit reform improved the financial incentives for partnership formation, this effect was largely undone by the subsequent 2003 Working Tax Credit reform. (JEL codes: H31, I38, J12) Copyright , Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Dan Anderberg & Florence Kondylis & Ian Walker, 2008. "Partnership Penalties and Bonuses Created by UK Welfare Programs," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 54(1), pages 1-21, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:54:y:2008:i:1:p:1-21
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifn001
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    Cited by:

    1. Marco Francesconi & Helmut Rainer & Wilbert vanderKlaauw, 2009. "The Effects of In-Work Benefit Reform in Britain on Couples: Theory and Evidence," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(535), pages 66-100, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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