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Contractual governance and illiberal contracts: some problems of contractualism as an instrument of behaviour management by agencies of government

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  • Mark Freedland
  • Desmond King

Abstract

This paper considers the significance, as a matter both of political and of legal analysis, of the considerable and growing use in the UK of ostensibly contractual or contract-like arrangements between public authorities and members of society whose behaviour it is judged necessary to manage and control. We argue that these new arrangements often amount to instruments of illiberal policy, both in procedure and implementation. Drawing on a model of contractual relations found in social work policy, we assess the manifestation of contract-like features in recent government policy toward young offenders and workfare participants. We then provide a detailed application of the illiberal argument in respect of the contractual arrangement promoted in the UK Government's New Deal programme and Jobseekers' Allowance. We conclude that illiberal tendencies in these workfare schemes may have unintended but nonetheless significant brutalising effects upon both participants and administrators. Copyright 2003, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Freedland & Desmond King, 2003. "Contractual governance and illiberal contracts: some problems of contractualism as an instrument of behaviour management by agencies of government," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 27(3), pages 465-477, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:27:y:2003:i:3:p:465-477
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