In writing about the "rhetoric of economics"--particularly about the standards which prevent situations where "anything goes" in argument--McCloskey takes an eclectic approach to two philosophical positions, based on Rorty and Habermas respectively. But these positions, despite sharing some common aspects, also differentiate themselves from each other sharply in important ways. In this paper, it is argued that this eclecticism of McCloskey is not coherent, as a result of her not completely grasping the fundamental differences between these two positions, and that this incoherence has damaging implications for her project of the rhetoric of economics. Copyright 2000 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 24 (2000) Issue (Month): 5 (September) Pages: 565-80 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Handle: RePEc:oup:cambje:v:24:y:2000:i:5:p:565-80
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