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Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment

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  • Ilyana Kuziemko

Abstract

This article investigates whether the death penalty encourages defendants charged with potentially capital crimes to plead guilty in exchange for lesser sentences. I exploit a natural experiment in New York State: the 1995 reinstatement of capital punishment, coupled with the public refusal of some prosecutors to pursue death sentences (N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 [McKinney 1975]). Using individual-level data on all felony arrests in the state between 1985 and 1998, I find the death penalty leads defendants to accept plea bargains with harsher terms, but does not increase defendants' overall propensity to plead guilty. A differences-in-differences analysis of a national cross-section of homicide defendants confirms these results. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

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  • Ilyana Kuziemko, 2006. "Does the Threat of the Death Penalty Affect Plea Bargaining in Murder Cases? Evidence from New York's 1995 Reinstatement of Capital Punishment," American Law and Economics Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 8(1), pages 116-142.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:amlawe:v:8:y:2006:i:1:p:116-142
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/aler/ahj005
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Frakes & Matthew Harding, "undated". "The Deterrent Effect of Expansions in Death Penalty Eligibility Criteria," Discussion Papers 08-033, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
    2. Richard T. Boylan, 2012. "The Effect of Punishment Severity on Plea Bargaining," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 55(3), pages 565-591.
    3. Fusako Tsuchimoto & Libor Dusek, 2009. "Responses to More Severe Punishment in the Courtroom: Evidence from Truth-in-Sentencing Laws," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp403, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

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