Pleasures of Cockaigne: Quality Gaps, Market Structure, and the Amount of Grading
AbstractThe article explores under what circumstances high-quality producers would not voluntarily submit to grading when low-quality firms would readily do so and under what conditions high-quality firms would have a lesser proportion of their output graded than would their low-quality counterparts. It also investigates how market structure affects the decison to grade, establishing that a competitive industry carries out the optimal amount of grading. When some firms have finite market shares, the industry engages in excessive grading. Copyright 1999, Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Agricultural and Applied Economics Association in its journal American Journal of Agricultural Economics.
Volume (Year): 81 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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