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Central Bank Independence And Macroeconomic Performances - An Empirical Approach

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  • Dumiter Florin Cornel

    ()
    (Vasile Goldis Western University of Arad, Economic Sciences)

  • Coroiu Sorina

    ()
    (University of Oradea, Economic Sciences)

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    Abstract

    The empirical evidence upon the macroeconomic performances of the independent central banks do not always have been successfully. In some cases, the consistency of the indices based on the interpretation of central banks statues used for measuring the degree of central bank independence is controversial, particularly for some of the indices. Moreover, the correlations between central bank independence and macroeconomic performance variables are not always confirmed, the causal relationship between central bank independence and inflation is controversial, and the higher disinflation costs, as a result of a higher sacrifice ratio correlated with the degree of independence is controversial, too. The effects of central bank independence upon macroeconomic performances focalized upon the empirical evidence of inflation, output or economic grouth and the disinflation costs. This is due to the lack of studies vis - á - vis of relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances regarding some variables like interest rates and budgetary deficits. Specialists consider inflation and output as the main determinats of the social welfare. The economic literature regarding this fact suggests that the central bank is seen as a free lunch institution. This hypothesis sustains that independent central banks will have social benefits in terms of lower inflation rates, but without any costs in terms of the real macroeconomic performances as a higher output volatility or a lower economic growth. In this article we provide a qualitative analyses regarding the relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances. For this purpose the authors' used the new index for measuring central bank independence and inflation targeting based on three pillars: political and legal central bank independence, central bank governance and conduct of monetary policy, central bank transparency and accountability. For estimating the connections between the evolution of central bank independence and macroeconomic performances we used five macroeconomic variables: GDP in constant prices, Harmonised Price Consumer Index, unemployment rate, budgetary deficit and current account deficit. Both measuring the degree of central bank independence and evaluating the average levels of the macroeconomic variables were analysed in the period 1990 - 2009, within 20 less developing countries. The final results will help clarify the complex relationship between central bank independence and macroeconomic performances in countries who fostered a large amount of institutional shift in recent years.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Oradea, Faculty of Economics in its journal The Journal of the Faculty of Economics - Economic.

    Volume (Year): 1 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (July)
    Pages: 487-493

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    Handle: RePEc:ora:journl:v:1:y:2011:i:1:p:487-493

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    Related research

    Keywords: Central bank transparency; central bank accountability; inflation targeting; macroeconomic outcomes; free lunch hypothesis;

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    1. Patricia S. Pollard, 1993. "Central bank independence and economic performance," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 21-36.
    2. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Stefan Krause, 2002. "Central bank structure, policy efficiency, and macroeconomic performance: exploring empirical relationships," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 47-60.
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