How Reported Board Independence Overstates Actual Board Independence in Family Firms: A Methodological Concern
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DOI: 10.1561/109.00000018
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More about this item
Keywords
Board independence; CEO succession; Family ownership;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- L26 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Entrepreneurship
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