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Federalism and Incentives for Success of Democracy

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Author Info

  • Myerson, Roger B.

Abstract

Success and failure of democracy are interpreted as different equilibria of a dynamic political game with cost of changing leadership and incomplete information about politicians' virtue. Unitary democracy can be frustrated when voters do not replace corrupt leaders, because any new leader would probably also govern corruptly. However, federal democracy cannot be consistently frustrated at both national and provincial levels, because provincial leaders who govern responsibly could build reputations to become contenders for higher national office. Similarly, democracy cannot be consistently frustrated in a democratization process that begins with decentralized provincial democracy and only later introduces nationally elected leadership.

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File URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00000002
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by now publishers in its journal International Quarterly Journal of Political Science.

Volume (Year): 1 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 3-23

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Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00000002

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Web page: http://www.nowpublishers.com/

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Cited by:
  1. Myerson, Roger, 2014. "Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of Pakistan," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 46-54.
  2. Adam, Antonis & Delis, Manthos D & Kammas, Pantelis, 2012. "Fiscal decentralization and public sector efficiency: Evidence from OECD countries," MPRA Paper 36889, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Weingast, Barry R., 2009. "Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 279-293, May.
  4. Libman, Alexander, 2009. "Essays on Asymmetric Federalism," MPRA Paper 21591, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. Islam, Jamal & Mohajan, Haradhan & Moolio, Pahlaj, 2010. "Methods of voting system and manipulation of voting," MPRA Paper 50854, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2010.
  6. Vincenzo Galasso & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010. "Competing on Good Politicians," Working Papers 368, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  7. repec:cge:warwcg:130 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Jamal Nazrul Islam & Haradhan Kumar Mohajan & Pahlaj Moolio, 2009. "Political Economy and Social Welfare with Voting Procedure," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 2, pages 42-66, December.
  9. Malesky, Edmund & Nguyen, Cuong & Tran, Anh, 2013. "The Impact of Recentralization on Public Services: A Difference-in-Differences Analysis of the Abolition of Elected Councils in Vietnam," MPRA Paper 54187, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Ardanaz, Martín & Leiras, Marcelo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2014. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina and its Implications for Governance and Accountability," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 26-45.
  11. Martin Ardanaz & Marcelo Leiras & Mariano Tommasi, 2012. "The Politics of Federalism in Argentina: Implications for Governance and Accountability," Research Department Publications 4781, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  12. Weingast, Barry R., 2014. "Second Generation Fiscal Federalism: Political Aspects of Decentralization and Economic Development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 53(C), pages 14-25.
  13. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
  14. Majumdar, Sumon & Mukand, Sharun W, 2013. "Institution Building and Political Economy," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 131, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  15. Fan, C. Simon & Lin, Chen & Treisman, Daniel, 2009. "Political decentralization and corruption: Evidence from around the world," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1-2), pages 14-34, February.
  16. Robert P. Inman, 2008. "Federalism's Values and the Value of Federalism," NBER Working Papers 13735, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Geys, Benny & Vermeir, Jan, 2012. "Party cues in elections under multilevel governance: Theory and evidence from US states," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-107, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  18. Darwin Cortés, 2011. "Decentralization of government and contracting with the private sector," Working Papers 2011/43, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  19. repec:ksb:journl:v:2:y:2009:i:1:p:42-66 is not listed on IDEAS

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