Economic Models of Environment Monitoring under Imperfect Information and High Costs
AbstractThe paper considers monitoring of environmental change as the central element of environmental regulation. Monitoring, as each kind of principal-agent relations, easily gives rise to corruptive behavior. In the paper we analyze economic models of environmental monitoring with high costs, incomplete information and corruption. These models should be the elements of environmental economics and are needed to create an effective system of nature protection measures.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki" in its journal Voprosy Economiki.
Volume (Year): 4 (2014)
Issue (Month): ()
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Web page: http://www.vopreco.ru/eng/year.html
monitoring; environment; pollution; public goods; externalities; taxes; corruption; principal-agent problem.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D69 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Other
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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