Economic Incentives and Social Preferences: Substitutes or Complements?
AbstractPart 1 Explicit economic incentives designed to increase contributions to public goods and to promote other pro-social behavior sometimes are counterproductive or less effective than would be predicted among entirely self-interested individuals. This may occur when incentives adversely affect individuals’ altruism, ethical norms, intrinsic motives to serve the public, and other social preferences. The opposite also occurs—crowding in — though it appears less commonly.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki" in its journal Voprosy Economiki.
Volume (Year): 4 (2013)
Issue (Month): ()
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Web page: http://www.vopreco.ru/eng/year.html
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