Innovations, Institutions, and Evolution
AbstractThe article examines the features of the economic order that has been established in the former Soviet republics and impedes their innovative development. It is shown that this order, based on the family and clan private economic power, rejects the cooperation of economic actors that produce, select and inherit the «short rules» of interaction. It is proved that, in order to change it, it is necessary to create conditions for restricting private economic power through co-opetition, formation of organizational identification and «long rules» of interaction among economic actors.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki" in its journal Voprosy Economiki.
Volume (Year): 9 (2010)
Issue (Month): ()
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Web page: http://www.vopreco.ru/eng/year.html
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