The Survival of the Nordic Welfare State and Social Trust
AbstractWhy does free riding not escalate in the universal Nordic welfare state? How is it possible to maintain such a cooperative equilibrium where most people tend to cooperate? Our model suggests that the “missing link” is the accumulated stock of cooperation norms in terms of social trust. Arguably, a sufficient number of norm enforcers facilitate this unique collective insurance system.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 36 (2010)
Issue (Month): ()
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