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Team Production Theory and Corporate Law

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  • Margaret M. Blair
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    Abstract

    Corporations can be understood as solutions to team production problems, rather than as property. Incorporation involves creation of a new legal entity in which control rights are separated from residual claim rights. The corporation itself, not the shareholders nor any other corporate participants, becomes the owner of assets used in production, and of output. Decision-making authority is vested in an organizational hierarchy, headed by a board of directors that is legally independent of shareholders. Understanding corporations in this way helps explain a number of features of corporate law, and provides new insights into the theory of the firm.

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    File URL: http://www.nopecjournal.org/NOPEC_2001_a05.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.

    Volume (Year): 27 (2001)
    Issue (Month): ()
    Pages: 88-95

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    Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:27:y:2001:p:88-95

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    Web page: http://www.nopecjournal.org

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    1. Hart, Oliver D. & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Scholarly Articles 3448675, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, 1971. "Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations," UCLA Economics Working Papers 10A, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver, 1985. "The Cost and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," CEPR Discussion Papers 70, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
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    Cited by:
    1. Kirstein, Roland & Cooter, Robert D, 2006. "Anti-Sharing as a Theory of Partnerships and Firms," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt4441r9r1, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.

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