Patterns of Corporate Ownership: Insights from a unique data set
AbstractUsing a data base which is exceptionally rich and accurate by international standards, this paper quantifies a wide range of ownership structure characteristics for all Oslo Stock Exchange firms in the period 1989–1997. Overall, we find that their ownership structures differ remarkably from those of other European firms. We speculate that a socialdemocratic rule and strong legal protection of stockholder rights may explain why the personal investment in Norwegian listed firms is so limited (low direct ownership), why the largest owner is so small (low concentration), and why the other major owners are so large (flat power structure). Our findings raise two questions about the viability of corporate governance systems in general. The first is whether delegated monitoring carried out by state bureaucrats and corporate managers is an effective disciplining mechanism. The second question is whether low ownership concentration produces strong managers and weak owners or whether the flat power structure facilitates joint monitoring by owners who are individually weak, but collectively strong.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 27 (2001)
Issue (Month): ()
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Web page: http://www.nopecjournal.org
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
- K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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- Ongena, S. & Smith, D.C. & Michalsen, D, 2000. "Distressed Relationships: Lessons from the Norwegian Banking Crisis," Discussion Paper 2000-13, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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- Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009.
"The diversification cost of large, concentrated equity stakes. How big is it? Is it justified?,"
Finance Research Letters,
Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 56-72, June.
- Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "The diversification cost of large, concentrated equity stakes. How big is it? Is it justified?," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/22, University of Stavanger.
- Ødegaard, Bernt Arne, 2009. "Who moves stock prices? Monthly evidence," UiS Working Papers in Economics and Finance 2009/4, University of Stavanger.
- Odegaard, Bernt Arne, 2007. "Price differences between equity classes. Corporate control, foreign ownership or liquidity?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(12), pages 3621-3645, December.
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