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Mechanisms for Corruption Suppression

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Author Info

  • Vasin, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Nikolaev, P.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

  • Urazov, A.

    (Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)

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    Abstract

    Government agencies and large corporations meet similar problems related to control of agents dealing with outsiders: citizens under audit of the agency or clients of the company. In such interaction there typically exists a possibility of collusion. In order to prevent it, agencies and corporations usually organize hierarchical controlling structures. The present paper considers game-theoretic models of such structures and examines a problem of their optimal organization.

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    File URL: http://www.econorus.org/repec/journl/2011-10-10-30r.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by New Economic Association in its journal Journal of the New Economic Association.

    Volume (Year): (2011)
    Issue (Month): 10 ()
    Pages: 10-30

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    Handle: RePEc:nea:journl:y:2011:i:10:p:10-30

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    Related research

    Keywords: corruption; hierarchical structures; game-theoretic model;

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    1. HINDRIKS, Jean & KEEN, Michael & MUTHOO, Abhinay, . "Corruption, extortion and evasion," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1671, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    2. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July.
    3. Chander, Parkash & Wilde, Louis, 1992. "Corruption in tax administration," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 333-349, December.
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