L'affidamento mediante gara di contratti pubblici: l'importanza della reputazione
AbstractIn this paper we highlight how, in awarding public contracts, the reputation of the firms does not receive the same consideration in the legislation of different countries. In our analysis we show which are the potential negative consequences of awarding rules that, as in Italy, neglect this factor; consequently our model justifies the practice of those countries in which some kind of reputational mechanisms are utilized. The main economic literature emphasizes that the efficiency of the awarding procedure depends on the type of contractual rules, especially those regarding firm's remuneration. In this work we show the existence of a reverse link: when the enforcement of contractual terms is imperfect, the rules of the awarding mechanism can help to improve the efficiency of the contractual relationship. In some circumstances, awarding rules based only on the contents of each bid are not able to deal with the problem of opportunistic behaviour during the execution of the contract. Our model points out that the public administration can incentive the fairness of the contractor by considering not only the bids of the competitors, but also their different reputation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Società editrice il Mulino in its journal Politica economica.
Volume (Year): (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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- Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991.
"Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract,"
91-16, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
- Crémer, Jacques & Khalil, Fahad, 1991. "Gathering Information before Signing a Contract," IDEI Working Papers 5, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Cremer, J. & Khalil, F., 1991. "Gathering Information Before Signing a Contract," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-16, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
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