IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mje/mjejnl/v8y2012i2p99-114.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quandaries Of Privatization In A Market Adverse Environment - Major Inconsistencies In The Transition Strategy Of Serbia

Author

Listed:
  • Ljubomir Madzar

Abstract

Deeply rooted traditional values, specific and long drawn collective memories, ethnic heterogeneity and the egalitarian syndrome make Serbia a particularly inimical environment for privatization and other undertakings meant to transform the system into a market economy. Both political elites and the broad public have their - though distinct and evidently separate - reasons to oppose privatization. At the same time, political pressures from abroad and the declaratory effect of pronouncements for modernization make it attractive to produce the semblance of a determination to change the structure of ownership and allegedly to modernize the society. The resulting set of interacting forces is quite complex. The actual resistance to privatization manifests itself in obligating the buyers to adopt additional duties in the form of so called social and investment programs. These programs proved to be quite effective in complicating the privatization and slowing it down. The insoluble problem of finding the trade-offs between the purchasing price and each of these programs arose. It turned out that the state and its bureaucracy - true, contractually - took it upon themselves to determine how much should be invested in each privatized company. The government has neither the motivation nor expertise, and not even incentives to acquire the needed knowledge, for a proper carrying out of these functions. Had the government been able to play successfully the roles of manager, investor, innovator and the entrepreneur, privatization itself would not be necessary and would in fact be counterproductive. A further area covered by the paper is the set of economic and social factors underlying the opposition towards privatization and making it slower in relation to how it unfolded in the comparable countries in transition. Such are, among other, aging population and almost unbearable magnitude of the fiscal burden, the inclination of the elites to preserve the collectively held enterprises as their power base, the exceptionally high share of the grey economy, the entropy approaching the virtual break-up of the financial system, with unbelievably high amount of arrears, and prolonged appreciation of the national currency which impaired exports heavily and wiped out a number of material production sectors because of the unjustifiably tough competition on the part of imports. A number of comments were made on the sad state and low level of economic science which, rather than clarifying the perilous consequences of the described policies, has uncritically endorsed them.

Suggested Citation

  • Ljubomir Madzar, 2012. "Quandaries Of Privatization In A Market Adverse Environment - Major Inconsistencies In The Transition Strategy Of Serbia," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 8(2), pages 99-114.
  • Handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:2:p:99-114
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.mnje.com/mje/2012/v08-n02/mje_2012_v08-n02-a15.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: http://repec.mnje.com/mje/2012/v08-n02/mje_2012_v08-n02-a15.html
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
    2. Mueller,Dennis C., 2003. "Public Choice III," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521894753.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter J. Coughlin, 2015. "Probabilistic voting in models of electoral competition," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 13, pages 218-234, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl, 2014. "Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 137-153, June.
    3. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    4. Isidoro Mazza, 2011. "Public Choice," Chapters, in: Ruth Towse (ed.), A Handbook of Cultural Economics, Second Edition, chapter 51, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Yoichi Hizen & Kengo Kurosaka, 2021. "Monetary Costs Versus Opportunity Costs in a Voting Experiment," Working Papers SDES-2021-1, Kochi University of Technology, School of Economics and Management, revised Feb 2021.
    6. Benoît Le Maux, 2009. "Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(3), pages 447-465, December.
    7. Stephen Drinkwater & Colin Jennings, 2007. "Who are the expressive voters?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 179-189, July.
    8. Raul Alberto Ponce Rodriguez & Ikuho Kochi, 2017. "Remittances, Lorenz Dominance in the Distribution of Income and Redistribution," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 8(1).
    9. Valentino Larcinese, 2007. "Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: The Role of Turnout," Political Studies, Political Studies Association, vol. 55(3), pages 568-585, October.
    10. Micael Castanheira & Gaëtan Nicodème & Paola Profeta, 2012. "On the political economics of tax reforms: survey and empirical assessment," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 19(4), pages 598-624, August.
    11. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Esteve-Volart, Berta, 2011. "Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 376-384, June.
    12. Serge Blondel & Louis Lévy-garboua, 2011. "Can non-expected utility theories explain the paradox of not voting?," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3158-3168.
    13. Matthias Benz & Bruno S. Frey, "undated". "Corporate Governance: What can we Learn from Public Governance?," IEW - Working Papers 166, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    14. Belke, Ansgar & Potrafke, Niklas, 2012. "Does government ideology matter in monetary policy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(5), pages 1126-1139.
    15. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2018. "Public choice and political science: a view from Europe," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 245-257, June.
    16. Matthew D. Mitchell, 2019. "Uncontestable favoritism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 181(1), pages 167-190, October.
    17. Mause, Karsten, 2019. "Governing Public-Private Partnerships: The Problem of Low-Cost Decisions," EconStor Preprints 209582, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    18. Gawel, Erik & Lehmann, Paul & Strunz, Sebastian & Heuson, Clemens, 2018. "Public Choice barriers to efficient climate adaptation – theoretical insights and lessons learned from German flood disasters," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 14(3), pages 473-499, June.
    19. Kym Anderson & Gordon Rausser & Johan Swinnen, 2013. "Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 51(2), pages 423-477, June.
    20. Ikuho Kochi & Raúl A. Ponce Rodríguez, 2011. "Voting in federal elections for local public goods in a fiscally centralized economy," Estudios Económicos, El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos, vol. 26(1), pages 123-149.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:2:p:99-114. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Nikola Draskovic Jelcic (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.mnje.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.