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Pluralistic Institutional Solutions Of The Problem Of Externalities

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  • Bagrat Yerznkyan
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    Abstract

    In this paper, the evolution of institutional forms of taking account and controlling externalities is analyzed. Theorizing is based on the pluralistic from the institutional viewpoint concepts of 'transaction' and mode of coordination'. That is to say, the three types of transaction (managerial, bargaining, and rationing) indicated by John Commons which structure state-economy-society interaction and corresponding institutional setups (government regulation, Coase's market bargaining, and relational contracting with emphasis on the idea of corporate social responsibility, CSR) which structure contractual agreements. The choice of the transaction types and institutional arrangements depends on their relative efficiency. The paper includes a characterization of the Russian institutional setup and an analysis of advantages and disadvantages of the different forms of institutional arrangements designed for solving the problem of externalities.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT) in its journal Montenegrin Journal of Economics.

    Volume (Year): 8 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 2 ()
    Pages: 73-86

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    Handle: RePEc:mje:mjejnl:v:8:y:2012:i:2:p:73-86

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    1. B. Douglas Bernheim & Antonio Rangel, 2008. "Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics," NBER Working Papers 13737, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. L. Polishchuk, 2009. "Corporate Social Responsibility or Government Regulation: An Analysis of Institutional Choice," Problems of Economic Transition, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., vol. 52(8), pages 73-94, December.
    3. Laibson, David I., 1997. "Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting," Scholarly Articles 4481499, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    4. Bagrat Yerznkyan, 2006. "Specificity Of "Contractual" Relations Of Government And Business In Russian Fuel And Energy Sector," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 2(3), pages 139-150.
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    9. Dahlman, Carl J, 1979. "The Problem of Externality," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(1), pages 141-62, April.
    10. Kahneman, Daniel & Wakker, Peter P & Sarin, Rakesh, 1997. "Back to Bentham? Explorations of Experienced Utility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(2), pages 375-405, May.
    11. David I. Laibson & Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, 1998. "Self-Control and Saving for Retirement," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 91-196.
    12. Matveenko, V., 2010. "Stimulating Mechanisms in Ecologically Motivated Regulation: Will Ecological Policies in Transition and Developing Countries Become Efficient?," Journal of the New Economic Association, New Economic Association, issue 8, pages 10-34.
    13. Andrzej Rapaczynski, 1996. "The Roles of the State and the Market in Establishing Property Rights," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(2), pages 87-103, Spring.
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