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The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property

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  • Kristoffel Grechenig
  • Martin Kolmar

Abstract

The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.

Suggested Citation

  • Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Kolmar, 2014. "The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 5-23, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201403)170:1_5:tsemat_2.0.tx_2-9
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13871984731004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bagwell, Kyle, 1995. "Commitment and observability in games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 271-280.
    2. Kyung H. Baik & Jason F. Shogren, 2008. "Strategic Behavior in Contests: Comment," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 439-442, Springer.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2014. "What Makes Intervention Legitimate? 31st International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 12-15, 2013, Weimar, Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 1-4, March.
    2. HUSERAȘ Alin Teodor & BALTEȘ Nicolae, 2023. "Evaluation Of National Defense From An Economic Perspective," Revista Economica, Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Faculty of Economic Sciences, vol. 75(2), pages 87-97, June.
    3. Gerd Muehlheusser, 2014. "The State's Enforcement Monopoly and the Private Protection of Property," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 24-26, March.
    4. Golz, Michael & D'Amico, Daniel J., 2018. "Market concentration in the international drug trade," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 28-42.
    5. Ken Yahagi, 2018. "Private law enforcement with competing groups," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 285-297, August.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • P14 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P37 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
    • P48 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
    • N40 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - General, International, or Comparative

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