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Coercion and Consent

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  • James Konow

Abstract

Most moral justifications for coercion have been based on one of two arguments: the consent of the coerced, usually understood as univariate and discrete, or the beneficial consequences of coercion; but many cases do not fit these categories. This paper proposes that consent be understood as our inferences about the agreement of agents, which vary in fine degrees with multiple underlying factors, including agent discretion, the choice set, information, and competence. Moreover, consent interacts with other moral values, including consequences, in a pluralistic system of morals that depends on the context. Examples suggest this framework can be reconciled with moral intuitions better than rival systems.

Suggested Citation

  • James Konow, 2014. "Coercion and Consent," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 49-74, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201403)170:1_49:cac_2.0.tx_2-4
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13871984731086
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Konow, James, 2001. "Fair and square: the four sides of distributive justice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 137-164, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pietri, Antoine, 2015. "« Propriété » ou « possession » : une question de sémantique…ou de paradigme ? [“Property” or “possession”: just a matter of semantics…or paradigm?]," MPRA Paper 67096, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Christoph Engel & Urs Schweizer, 2014. "What Makes Intervention Legitimate? 31st International Seminar on the New Institutional Economics June 12-15, 2013, Weimar, Germany," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 1-4, March.
    3. Michael Kurschilgen, 2014. "Coercion and Consent," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 79-82, March.
    4. Dirk Engelmann, 2014. "Coercion and Consent," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(1), pages 75-78, March.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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