Substantive versus Procedural Liberalism: Exploring a Dilemma of Contemporary Liberal Thought
AbstractContemporary economic liberalism comes in two forms: a substantive version, which defines the scope and extent of economic policy, and a procedural version, which draws on citizens' preferences. Whereas the recent reconception of economic liberalism based on social-contract theory considers the two versions to be consonant with each other, this paper argues that they differ in ways largely overlooked. It is shown that the dilemma between these two types of liberalism is rooted in an inadequate transfer of the concept of preferences from household to politics. A solution for the dilemma is offered.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 165 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
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