A Cartel Analysis of the German Labor Institutions and its Implications for Labor Market Reforms
AbstractThis paper offers a cartel explanation for the stability of German collective bargaining institutions.We show that a dense net of legal safeguards has been yarned around the wage setting cartel. These measures make deviation by cartel insiders less attractive and simultaneously erect entry barriers for alternative unions. As we argue many recent labor policy measures, which make wages more flexible, serve to further stabilize the labor cartel, while truly pro-competitive proposals have not been implemented exactly because of their destabilizing effects.We propose policy measures that remove entry barriers and facilitate outside competition by alternative collective bargaining organizations.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 163 (2007)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
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Other versions of this item:
- Justus Haucap & Uwe Pauly & Christian Wey, 2006. "A Cartel Analysis of the German Labor Institutions and Its Implications for Labor Market Reforms," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 651, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Justus Haucap & Uwe Pauly & Christian Wey, 2007. "A Cartel Analysis of the German Labor Institutions and Its Implications for Labor Market Reforms," Ruhr Economic Papers 0009, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
- J52 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
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