This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Split-Award Tort Reform, Firm's Level of Care, and Litigation Outcomes

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Claudia M. Landeo
Maxim Nikitin

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We investigate the effect of the split-award tort reform, where the state takes a share of the plaintiff's punitive damage award, on the firm's level of care, the likelihood of trial, and the social costs of accidents. A decrease in the plaintiff's share of the punitive damage award reduces the firm's level of care and therefore increases the probability of accidents. The effects of split awards on the likelihood of trial and social costs of accidents are ambiguous. Conditions under which a decrease in the plaintiff's share of the punitive damage award reduces the probability of trial and the social cost of accidents are derived.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2006/00000162/00000004/art00003
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 162 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 571-600
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200612)162:4_571:strflo_2.0.tx_2-v

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite

Order Information:
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Wolpert).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 2000. "Found Money? Split-Award Statutes and Settlement of Punitive Damages Cases," Working Papers 0001, Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University, revised Mar 2001. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Schweizer, Urs, 1989. "Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(2), pages 163-77, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Karpoff, Jonathan M & Lott, John R, Jr, 1999. "On the Determinants and Importance of Punitive Damage Awards," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 527-73, April.
  4. Png, I. P. L., 1987. "Litigation, liability, and incentives for care," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 61-85, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, 1991. "Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 562-570, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1988. "The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(1), pages 151-64, January.
  7. Hylton, Keith N., 2002. "An asymmetric-information model of litigation," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 153-175, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Kahan, Marcel & Tuckman, Bruce, 1995. "Special levies on punitive damages: Decoupling, agency problems, and litigation expenditures," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 175-185, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Jennifer F. Reinganum & Louise L. Wilde, 1986. "Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(4), pages 557-566, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Spier, Kathryn E, 1997. "A Note on the Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 613-21, June.
  11. Chris William Sanchirico & Albert Choi, 2004. "Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling," Law and Economics 0403006, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Miceli, Thomas J, 1994. "Do Contingent Fees Promote Excessive Litigation?," Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 23(1), pages 211-24, January.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Landeo, Claudia M., 2009. "Tort Reform, Disputes and Belief Formation," MPRA Paper 13453, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes software components.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.