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Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations

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  • Robert H. Mnookin

Abstract

This paper compares strategic barriers to the resolution of conflict - those that may arise because rational self-interested actors try to maximize individual returns - in two party and multi-party negotiations. It suggests that the Pareto-criterion may not provide an appropriate standard to evaluate efficiency in multiparty bargaining because a requirement of unanimity may create potential holdout problems that pose severe strategic barriers. While a variety of procedural rules may permit decision-making without unanimity, the paper briefly explores the application of an unusual procedural rule - the "sufficient consensus" standard - that was employed in the multiparty "constitutional" negotiations in South Africa and in Northern Ireland.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert H. Mnookin, 2003. "Strategic Barriers to Dispute Resolution: A Comparison of Bilateral and Multilateral Negotiations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 159(1), pages 199-220, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200303)159:1_199:sbtdra_2.0.tx_2-8
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    Cited by:

    1. Dietmar Harhoff & Georg von Graevenitz & Stefan Wagner, 2016. "Conflict Resolution, Public Goods, and Patent Thickets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(3), pages 704-721, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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