International Environmental Agreements: How the Policy Instrument Affects Equilibrium Emissions and Welfare
AbstractTwo countries, differing with respect to opportunity cost of abatement and evironmental damage cost, negotiating joint emission reductions are considered. The bargaining process is analyzed in two policy regimes: Emission tax and transferable discharge permits. Emissions and welfare of the bargaining equilibria under these regimes are compared to each other and to the social optimum. The conditions for the superiority of the tax over the permit regime and vice versa are specified.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 155 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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- Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
- Ralph Winkler, 2006.
"Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting,"
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06/60, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Winkler, Ralph, 2009. "Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, Kiel Institute for the World Economy, vol. 3(12), pages 1-22.
- Winkler, Ralph, 2009. "Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting," Economics Discussion Papers 2009-4, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
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