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International Environmental Agreements: How the Policy Instrument Affects Equilibrium Emissions and Welfare

Author

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  • Alfred Endres
  • Michael Finus

Abstract

Two countries, differing with respect to opportunity cost of abatement and evironmental damage cost, negotiating joint emission reductions are considered. The bargaining process is analyzed in two policy regimes: Emission tax and transferable discharge permits. Emissions and welfare of the bargaining equilibria under these regimes are compared to each other and to the social optimum. The conditions for the superiority of the tax over the permit regime and vice versa are specified.

Suggested Citation

  • Alfred Endres & Michael Finus, 1999. "International Environmental Agreements: How the Policy Instrument Affects Equilibrium Emissions and Welfare," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 155(3), pages 527-527, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(199909)155:3_527:ieahtp_2.0.tx_2-j
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    Cited by:

    1. Partha Dasgupta & Dale Southerton & Alistair Ulph & David Ulph, 2016. "Consumer Behaviour with Environmental and Social Externalities: Implications for Analysis and Policy," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 191-226, September.
    2. Alejandro Caparrós, 2016. "Bargaining and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 5-31, September.
    3. Winkler, Ralph, 2009. "Now or Never: Environmental Protection under Hyperbolic Discounting," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 3, pages 1-22.
    4. Carlo Gallier & Martin Kesternich & Bodo Sturm, 2017. "Voting for Burden Sharing Rules in Public Goods Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(3), pages 535-557, July.
    5. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 2015. "Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics–In Honour of Alfred Endres," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 657-664, December.
    6. Gallier, Carlo & Kesternich, Martin & Sturm, Bodo, 2014. "On the Choice and the Effects of Rule-Based Contribution Schemes in Public Good Games," VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy 100421, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. Tiziano Distefano & Simone D'Alessandro, 2017. "An Evolutionary approach to International Environmental Agreements," SEEDS Working Papers 0517, SEEDS, Sustainability Environmental Economics and Dynamics Studies, revised Sep 2017.
    8. B. Curtis Eaton, 2004. "The elementary economics of social dilemmas," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 37(4), pages 805-829, November.
    9. Wolfgang Buchholz & Alexander Haupt & Wolfgang Peters, 2016. "Equity as a Prerequisite for Stability of Cooperation on Global Public Good Provision," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 61-78, September.
    10. Tiziano Distefano & Simone D’Alessandro, 2021. "A new two-nested-game approach: linking micro- and macro-scales in international environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 493-516, September.
    11. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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