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Cost-Benefit Analysis of Presumptive Taxation

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  • Shlomo Yitzhaki

Abstract

Most of the literature on presumptive taxation limits its application to the less-developed economies. In this paper I argue that presumptive taxes are well entrenched in the modern world, although usually not classified as such. Presumptive taxes can take many forms, and can be incorporated in sections of a tax law that is not generally presumptive. The difficulties that developed economies face collecting tax revenues, the rising fear of an intrusive government, and efficiency considerations may all portend a larger role for presumptive taxation - whether or not so designated - in the developing and developed economies.

Suggested Citation

  • Shlomo Yitzhaki, 2007. "Cost-Benefit Analysis of Presumptive Taxation," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 63(3), pages 311-326, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200709)63:3_311:caopt_2.0.tx_2-5
    DOI: 10.1628/001522107X250087
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    Cited by:

    1. Al-Karablieh, Yazan & Koumanakos, Evangelos & Stantcheva, Stefanie, 2021. "Clearing the bar: Improving tax compliance for small firms through target setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 130(C).
    2. Ferrara, Giancarlo & Bucci, Valeria & Campagna, Arianna, 2023. "Audit, presumptive taxation and efficiency: An integrated approach for tax compliance analysis," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 47(3).
    3. Bíró, Anikó & Prinz, Dániel & Sándor, László, 2022. "The minimum wage, informal pay, and tax enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 215(C).
    4. ferrara, giancarlo & campagna, arianna & bucci, valeria & atella, vincenzo, 2021. "Presumptive taxation and firms’ efficiency: an integrated approach for tax compliance analysis," MPRA Paper 111516, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2009. "A model of the Italian cut-off system for taxing small businesses," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 127-134, June.
    6. Mykhailo Sverdan, 2022. "Lump-Sum Tax Is An Alternative To Wealth Taxation," Three Seas Economic Journal, Publishing house "Baltija Publishing", vol. 3(4).
    7. Libor Dušek & Klára Kalíšková & Daniel Münich, 2014. "Dopady reformy přímých daní k roku 2015: vyhodnocení pomocí modelu TAXBEN [The Impacts of the 2015 Reform of Direct Taxation: Evaluation with a TAXBEN Model]," Politická ekonomie, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2014(6), pages 749-768.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    presumptive taxation; tagging; tax administration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
    • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
    • H29 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Other

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