Strategic Taxation on Mobile Capital with Spillover Externality
AbstractBy incorporating spillover externality into the model, a generalization of the strategic tax competition model is attempted to find the equilibrium tax rates chosen by both capital import and export jurisdictions. The result shows that jurisdictions not only choose their capital tax rates to manipulate the terms of trade, but also adjust them to control capital allocation among the jurisdictions to receive appropriate benefit spillovers.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 63 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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