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Tax Incentives for Private Life Annuities and the Social Security Reform: Effects on Consumption and on Adverse Selection

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Author Info
Susanne Pech

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Abstract

In a two-period model with uncertainty about life expectancy, we analyze several measures that are typically included in a social security reform: tax incentives for private life annuities, a cut in the social security benefits, and an increase in the social security tax. First, we look at the demand side and study the effects on old-age provision for a given annuity price. It is shown that tax incentives for life annuities indeed stimulate annuity demand, if a cut in the supply of public goods to finance the tax incentives does not influence the private consumption choice. In this case, such incentives counteract the negative effects on old-age consumption of the other two reform instruments adopted to maintain long-run solvency of the social security system. However, when considering an increase in the income tax to finance the tax incentives, the positive effect on annuity demand is smaller and may even turn negative for some individuals. Second, we assess the effects of the reform measures on the equilibrium price, in view of an adverse-selection problem in the private annuity market. We find that a cut in the social security benefit rate reduces the adverse selection and consequently the equilibrium price, while an increase in the social security tax raises the equilibrium price. The effect of a tax incentive for life annuities is ambiguous and depends on the degree of risk aversion of the individuals. Adverse selection is mitigated if the coefficient of relative risk aversion does not exceed a critical value, which is shown to be higher in the case when the tax incentives are financed by a reduction in public goods than in the case when they are financed by an increase in the income tax.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.

Volume (Year): 60 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 556-
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200412)60:4_556:tifpla_2.0.tx_2-b

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Related research
Keywords: annuity market; uncertain lifetime; adverse selection; tax incentives; social security;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice and Growth - - - Intertemporal Consumer Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Johann K. Brunner & Susanne Pech, 2002. "Adverse selection in the annuity market with sequential and simultaneous insurance demand," Economics working papers 2002-04, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Wilson, Charles, 1977. "A model of insurance markets with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 167-207, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Olivia S. Mitchell et al., 1999. "New Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1299-1318, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. O. Attanasio & H. W. Hoynes, . "Differential mortality and wealth accumulation," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1079-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Eckstein, Zvi & Eichenbaum, Martin & Peled, Dan, 1985. "Uncertain lifetimes and the welfare enhancing properties of annuity markets and social security," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 303-326, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Abel, Andrew B, 1986. "Capital Accumulation and Uncertain Lifetimes with Adverse Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1079-97, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Walliser, Jan, 2000. " Adverse Selection in the Annuities Market and the Impact of Privatizing Social Security," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 102(3), pages 373-93, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Lillard, L.A. & Waite, L.J., 1996. "Marital Disruption and Mortality," Papers 96-01, RAND - Reprint Series.
  9. Johann K. Brunner & Susanne Pech, 2000. "Adverse selection in the annuity market when payoffs vary over the time of retirement," Economics working papers 2000-30, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Pauly, Mark V, 1974. "Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 88(1), pages 44-62, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Rothschild, Michael & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 630-49, November.
  12. R Disney & C Emmerson & M Wakefield, 2001. "Pension reform and saving in Britain," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(1), pages 70-94, Spring.
  13. Schnabel, Reinhold, 1998. "Vermögen und Ersparnis im Lebenszyklus in Westdeutschland," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-43, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim & Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
  14. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2002. "Selection Effects in the United Kingdom Individual Annuities Market," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(476), pages 28-50, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Kent A. Smetters & Jan Walliser, 1998. "Opting Out of Social Security and Adverse Selection," NBER Working Papers 6430, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Richard Disney & Carl Emmerson & Sarah Smith, 2003. "Pension Reform and Economic Performance in Britain in the 1980s and 1990s," NBER Working Papers 9556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Johann K. Brunner & Susanne Pech, 2005. "Optimum Taxation of Life Annuities," Economics working papers 2005-06, Department of Economics, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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