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Tax Evasion with Earned Income - An Experimental Study

Author

Listed:
  • Vital Anderhub
  • Sebastian Giese
  • Werner Güth
  • Antje Hoffmann
  • Thomas Otto

Abstract

In our tax evasion experiment each participant earns his income by solving intertemporal allocation tasks. The resulting income has to be declared in a tax return which is randomly verified. If tax evasion is detected, the subject is punished by a fixed penalty capturing the fact that (in Germany) tax fraud is a crime. The experiment consists of four tax periods, the final two involving an increased tax rate. Taxes are donated to charity organizations, chosen by subjects. According to our results higher income levels encourage tax evasion, surprisingly an increased tax rate does not.

Suggested Citation

  • Vital Anderhub & Sebastian Giese & Werner Güth & Antje Hoffmann & Thomas Otto, 2001. "Tax Evasion with Earned Income - An Experimental Study," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 58(2), pages 188-188, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(200202)58:2_188:tewei-_2.0.tx_2-z
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Christoph Engel, 2016. "Experimental Criminal Law. A Survey of Contributions from Law, Economics and Criminology," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2016_07, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    2. Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher, 2013. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 225-246, April.
    3. Bayer, Ralph-C., 2006. "A contest with the taxman - the impact of tax rates on tax evasion and wastefully invested resources," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(5), pages 1071-1104, July.
    4. Kirchler, Erich & Maciejovsky, Boris & Schneider, Friedrich, 2003. "Everyday representations of tax avoidance, tax evasion, and tax flight: Do legal differences matter?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 535-553, August.
    5. Casal, Sandro & Mittone, Luigi, 2016. "Social esteem versus social stigma: The role of anonymity in an income reporting game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 55-66.
    6. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    7. Grundmann, Susanna & Graf Lambsdorff, Johann, 2017. "How income and tax rates provoke cheating – An experimental investigation of tax morale," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 27-42.
    8. Khalil, Sandra & Sidani, Yusuf, 2020. "The influence of religiosity on tax evasion attitudes in Lebanon," Journal of International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation, Elsevier, vol. 40(C).
    9. Sandro Casal & Veronika Grimm & Simeon Schächtele, 2019. "Taxation with Mobile High-Income Agents: Experimental Evidence on Tax Compliance and Equity Perceptions," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(4), pages 1-29, October.
    10. Erich Kirchler & Stephan Muehlbacher & Barbara Kastlunger & Ingrid Wahl, 2007. "Why Pay Taxes? A Review of Tax Compliance Decisions," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0730, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    11. Alex Reuben Kira, 2017. "An Evaluation of Governments’ Initiatives in Enhancing Small Taxpayers’ Voluntary Tax Compliance in Developing Countries," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 7(1), pages 253-267, January.
    12. Werner Güth & Sabine Strauß & Matthias Sutter, 2005. "Tax Evasion And State Productivity—An Experimental Study," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(1), pages 85-100, February.
    13. Inna Cabelkova, 2021. "Sustainability of State Budgetary Expenses: Tax Compliance of Low-, Middle-, and High-Income Groups—The Evidence from the Czech Republic," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(16), pages 1-16, August.
    14. Erich Kirchler & Boris Maciejovsky, "undated". "Steuermoral und Steuerhinterziehung," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-18, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
    15. Grundmann, Susanna, 2020. "Do just deserts and competition shape patterns of cheating?," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-79-20, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    16. Durham, Yvonne & Manly, Tracy S. & Ritsema, Christina, 2014. "The effects of income source, context, and income level on tax compliance decisions in a dynamic experiment," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 220-233.
    17. James, Simon & Edwards, Alison, 2010. "An annotated bibliography of tax compliance and tax compliance costs," MPRA Paper 26106, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior

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