Tax Competition and Trade Protection
AbstractThis paper reconsiders the question of whether tax competition for mobile capital leads to tax rates on capital that are too low or too high from the combined viewpoint of the competing regions (or countries in an economic union). In contrast to standard models of tax competition, both commodity trade and capital mobility is allowed to occur between the competing regions and the rest of the world. A key result of the analysis is that whether the capital taxes are too low or high depends on the degree of external trade protection.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal FinanzArchiv.
Volume (Year): 56 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3/4 (July)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.mohr.de/fa
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Other versions of this item:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Brecher, Richard A. & Feenstra, Robert C., 1983. "International trade and capital mobility between diversified economies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3-4), pages 321-339, May.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
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21-92, Tel Aviv.
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- Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992. "Protection For Sale," NBER Working Papers 4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992. "Protection for Sale," Papers 162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
- Clemens Fuest & Bernd Huber, 1999. "Can Tax Coordination Work?," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 56(3/4), pages 443-, July.
- Lenka Janíčková, 2012. "Tax Harmonization – the Possible Way out of the Crisis?," Český finanční a účetní časopis, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(1), pages 64-81.
- Libman, Alexander, 2005. "Взаимодействие Государственных И Частных Структур В Интеграционных Группировах: Теоретические Подходы И Оп," MPRA Paper 17044, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Agnès Bénassy-Quéré & Lionel Fontagné & Amina Lahrèche-Revil, 2000. "Foreign Direct Investment and the Prospects for Tax Co-Ordination in Europe," Working Papers 2000-06, CEPII research center.
- GaÃ«tan NicodÃ¨me, 2006. "Corporate tax competition and coordination in the European Union: What do we know? Where do we stand?," European Economy - Economic Papers 250, Directorate General Economic and Monetary Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
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