The Russian Model of "Negotiated Federalism"
AbstractThe distribution of powers, spheres of activity, and resources between the center and the regions in mature federations is stable, predictable, and clearly outlined, and is based on a solid foundation in the form of a constitution, the judicial and legal system, and many years of political tradition. Political behavior in such federations is determined by explicitly stipulated and identically perceived "rules of the game," and thus derives from existing federal institutions. In Russia, this connection is the oppositeâhere the institutions of federalism are formed spontaneously in the course of the political processes taking place, where the preferences and resources of the political elites drawn into them predominate.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. in its journal Problems of Economic Transition.
Volume (Year): 41 (1998)
Issue (Month): 7 (November)
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Web page: http://mesharpe.metapress.com/link.asp?target=journal&id=106047
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