Fisheries managers and advisors in developing countries face challenges that may be difficult to overcome, because they use doctrines, principles and models of management and economics that do not adequately explain the problems that need to be solved. This may perpetuate non-sustainable policies, because broader issues important to fisheries sustainability are not accounted for more eclectic studies of the economic behaviour of humans within the context of their respective societies may be useful. Advice and policy based upon a more varied knowledge of different branches of economics provides insights into how managers might deal with the more difficult problems they confront. The author motivates these ideas by discussing new international trade theory and fisheries agreements, New Institutional Economics (NIT) applied to public management of fisheries conflicts and applications of Public Choice (PC) theory to the economics of corruption. These theoretical ideas are discussed with references to observations in the field.
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Volume (Year): 7 (2007) Issue (Month): 2 (January) Pages: 205-220 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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