Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Is Three a Crowd? Competition among Regulators in Banking

Contents:

Author Info

  • Rosen, Richard J

Abstract

Banks are able to switch among three options for a primary federal regulator: the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, and the OCC. We examine why they switch and what the results of switches are. We find support for the hypothesis that competition among regulators has beneficial aspects. Regulators seem to specialize in offering banks that are changing strategy the ability to improve performance by switching regulators. There is also evidence that the ability to switch regulators allows banks to get away from bank examiners who desire a quiet life, that is, examiners who attempt to minimize the effort they spend on work.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 35 (2003)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 967-98

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:6:p:967-98

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. International Monetary Fund, 2006. "Regulatory Capture in Banking," IMF Working Papers 06/34, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Agur, Itai, 2009. "Regulatory Competition and Bank Risk Taking," CEPR Discussion Papers 7524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Feng, Guohua & Zhang, Xiaohui, 2012. "Productivity and efficiency at large and community banks in the US: A Bayesian true random effects stochastic distance frontier analysis," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 1883-1895.
  4. Agur, Itai, 2013. "Multiple bank regulators and risk taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 259-268.
  5. Martin Cihák & Jörg Decressin, 2007. "The Case for a European Banking Charter," IMF Working Papers 07/173, International Monetary Fund.
  6. Adams, Renee B. & Santos, Joao A.C., 2006. "Identifying the effect of managerial control on firm performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 55-85, April.
  7. Rezende, Marcelo, 2014. "The Effects of Bank Charter Switching on Supervisory Ratings," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2014-20, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Itai Agur & Sunil Sharma, 2013. "Rules, Discretion, and Macro-Prudential Policy," IMF Working Papers 13/65, International Monetary Fund.
  9. Richard J. Rosen, 2005. "Switching primary federal regulators: is it beneficial for U.S. banks?," Economic Perspectives, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Q III, pages 16-23.
  10. Yuliya Demyanyk & Elena Loutskina, 2012. "Mortgage companies and regulatory arbitrage," Working Paper 1220R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:35:y:2003:i:6:p:967-98. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.