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Competitive Banking, Bankers' Clubs, and Bank Regulation

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  • Dowd, Kevin

Abstract

This paper reexamines the view that banking regulation and central banking arose to counter market 'failures.' It investigates the factors that led bankers to form clubs and examines the 'regulations' imposed by clubs on their members. It suggests that such regulation is different from real-world regulation and central banking and would be unlikely to arise spontaneously from free banking anyway. It also suggests that this view is consistent with available evidence and compares it with the alternative views of Gary Gorton and Donald J. Mullineaux (1987), and of Charles A. E. Goodhart. Copyright 1994 by Ohio State University Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.

Volume (Year): 26 (1994)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 289-308

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Handle: RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:26:y:1994:i:2:p:289-308

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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879

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Cited by:
  1. Iman van Lelyveld & Arnold Schilder, 2002. "Risk in Financial Conglomerates: Management and Supervision," Research Series Supervision (discontinued) 49, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
  2. Fernando Ossa, 2003. "Los Bancos Centrales como Prestamistas de Última Instancia," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 40(120), pages 323-335.
  3. Young, Andrew T. & Dove, John A., 2013. "Policing the chain gang: Panel cointegration analysis of the stability of the Suffolk System, 1825–1858," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 182-196.
  4. Selgin, George, 2004. "Wholesale payments: questioning the market-failure hypothesis," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 333-350, September.
  5. Caplan, Bryan & Stringham, Edward, 2003. "Networks, law, and the paradox of cooperation," MPRA Paper 26086, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. David Vanhoose, 1997. "Macroeconomic stability in a free banking system," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(4), pages 331-343, December.
  7. Winkler, Adalbert, 2001. "On the need for an international lender of last resort: Lessons from domestic financial markets," W.E.P. - Würzburg Economic Papers 28, University of Würzburg, Chair for Monetary Policy and International Economics.

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