The Federal Reserve as a Bureaucracy: An Examination of Expense-Preference Behavior
AbstractIn this paper, the Federal Reserve System is viewed as a bureaucracy with a bureau's incentive to increase expenses beyond the profit maximizing point. Moreover, the bureau consists of divisions, the district banks, that exhibit their own expense-prefer ence behavior. An empirical investigation of labor demand by the Boar d and district banks reported in this paper demonstrates that the Fed eral Reserve has engaged in expense-preference behavior and that the centralization of the monetary authority amplified this type of behav ior. Copyright 1988 by Ohio State University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Blackwell Publishing in its journal Journal of Money, Credit and Banking.
Volume (Year): 20 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879
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- Loretta J. Mester, 2003. "Applying efficiency measurement techniques to central banks," Working Papers 03-13, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
- Vaubel, Roland, 1997. "The bureaucratic and partisan behavior of independent central banks: German and international evidence," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 201-224, May.
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