Consumer deposit pricing has recently been the subject of close public scrutiny. Banks have been accused of monopolistically setting fees for some of their deposit services at levels greater than associated costs. This paper examines consumer deposit pricing in a world characterized by imperfect information about a heterogeneous customer population. It is demonstrated that banks, in order to minimize an adverse selection problem, utilize a menu of pricing elements including NSF fees, minimum balance requirements, and deposit hold schedules. As a result, competitive banks may be deliberately overcharging for some component deposit services while simultaneously undercharging for others. Copyright 1986 by Ohio State University Press.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 18 (1986) Issue (Month): 4 (November) Pages: 495-505 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Related research
Keywords:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)