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Reputation, Drohungen und Vergeltung: Wiederholte Spiele als Bezugsrahmen für die Analyse von Markteintritten

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  • Kohn Karsten

    (KfW Bankengruppe, Frankfurt, und IZA, Bonn. Korrespondenz: KfW, Palmengartenstr. 5-9, 60325 Frankfurt/Main)

Abstract

Despite descriptive empirical evidence on start-up numbers and survival rates of young firms, the interaction of market entry decisions and reactions of incumbent competitors is still insufficiently understood in the entrepreneurship literature. Repeated games offer a suitable theoretical framework. This paper provides a review of the literature on repeated games with focus on market entry and its deterrence. It introduces a consistent analytical framework and summarizes central results on equilibrium outcomes of repeated interaction by means of folk theorems. Variants of Selten’s (1978) chain store paradox illustrate the roles of threats and reputation, cooperation, and retaliation. Dovetailing the theory of repeated games and empirical evidence remains a challenge for future research.

Suggested Citation

  • Kohn Karsten, 2014. "Reputation, Drohungen und Vergeltung: Wiederholte Spiele als Bezugsrahmen für die Analyse von Markteintritten," Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, De Gruyter, vol. 63(2), pages 185-216, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:lus:zwipol:v:63:y:2014:i:2:p:185-214
    DOI: 10.1515/zfwp-2014-0207
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