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¿Los Sistemas de Garantía se orientan al prestatario o a las entidades de crédito? Estudio de la experiencia en Latinoamérica/Are Guarantee Systems oriented towards borrowers or credit institutions? Study of the Latin American Experience

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  • GALLURT POVEDANO, JESÚS

    ()
    (Departamento Gestión Empresarial y Métodos Cuantitativos, UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA, ESPAÑA.)

  • RAMÍREZ SOBRINO, JESÚS N.

    ()
    (Departamento Gestión Empresarial y Métodos Cuantitativos, UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA, ESPAÑA.)

  • POMBO GONZÁLEZ, PABLO

    ()
    (Departamento de Estadística, econometría, investigación operativa, organización de empresas y economía aplicada, UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA, ESPAÑA.)

  • MOLINA SÁNCHEZ, HORACIO

    ()
    (Departamento Gestión Empresarial y Métodos Cuantitativos, UNIVERSIDAD DE CÓRDOBA, ESPAÑA.)

Abstract

Los sistemas de garantía responden a diversos tipos de esquemas y presentan diseños particulares sin que se haya estudiado hasta la fecha la eficacia de los mismos. Por otra parte, la actividad de garantía es beneficiosa para el empresario y para la entidad financiera, encontrando ambos agentes intereses comunes en los mismos que, unidos a los del sector público, configuran la actividad de garantía como una política que encuentre los vectores de coordinación más eficaces. El objetivo de este trabajo es explicar si las características de los sistemas se orientan a la atención de las entidades de crédito o de los prestatarios. Nuestros resultados revelan que los sistemas latinoamerica¬nos utilizan a las entidades crediticias como distribuidoras y son las características relacionadas con satisfacer las necesidades de la banca las que determinan un mayor número de pymes beneficiarias. Guarantee Systems answer to different types of schemes and show particular designs although they have not been studied until now the effectiveness of them. Anyway, guarantee activity is beneficial for the entrepreneur and for financial institutions, finding common interests on them that, joined to the public sector, shape the guarantee activity as a policy that find the most effective coordination vectors between agents. The purpose of this paper is to explain if the characteristics of the guarantee systems are focused on credit institutions or the borrowers. Our results disclose that Latinoamerican systems use credit entities as allocators and the characteristics related with the satisfaction of banking needs are critical for a larger number of attended businesses.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Estudios de Economía Aplicada in its journal Estudios de Economía Aplicada.

Volume (Year): 31 (2013)
Issue (Month): (Enero)
Pages: 251 (20pags)

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Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:31_1_8

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Related research

Keywords: Garantías; sistemas de garantía; adicionalidad. ; Guarantees; Guarantee Systems; Aditionality..;

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References

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  1. Columba, F. & Gambacorta, L. & Mistrulli, P.E., 2009. "Mutual Guarantee Institutions and Small Business Finance," Discussion Paper 2009-32 S, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-55, September.
  3. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1983. "Incentive Effects of Terminations: Applications to the Credit and Labor Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(5), pages 912-27, December.
  4. Salvatore Zecchini & Marco Ventura, 2009. "The impact of public guarantees on credit to SMEs," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 191-206, February.
  5. Vincent Chandler, 2012. "The economic impact of the Canada small business financing program," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 39(1), pages 253-264, July.
  6. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
  7. Inha Oh & Jeong-Dong Lee & Almas Heshmati & Gyoung-Gyu Choi, 2009. "Evaluation of credit guarantee policy using propensity score matching," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 335-351, October.
  8. Manove, Michael & Padilla, A Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2001. "Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(4), pages 726-44, Winter.
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