Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

¿Es competitivo el mercado eléctrico español? Indicadores de abuso de poder de mercado y aplicación al caso de España/Is the Spanish Electricity Wholesale Market Competitive? Indicators of Abuse of Dominant Position and Application to the Case of Spain

Contents:

Author Info

  • ARNEDILLO BLANCO, OSCAR

    ()
    (NERA Economic Consulting, ESPAÑA.)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Desde principios de los años 90 se ha producido una ola de liberalizaciones de los mercados eléctricos bajo la premisa de que la presión competitiva llevaría a una reducción en el coste de suministro. No obstante, gran parte de los estudios académicos concluyen que estos mercados están distorsionados por el abuso de poder de mercado. Sin embargo estos estudios se basan en modelos teóricos y herramientas que parten de una representación simplificada de la realidad, sesgando sus resultados y exagerando el riesgo de abuso. Este artículo repasa las limitaciones de algunas de estas herramientas y, como alternativa, sugiere diversos indicadores derivados de la observación del comportamiento que realmente tienen de los generadores, de modo a obtener conclusiones más robustas y fiables sobre su comportamiento. Estos indicadores permiten rechazar la hipótesis de que existe un problema de poder de mercado en el mercado eléctrico español. Since the early 90's there has been a wave of deregulation of electricity markets under the assumption that competitive pressures would lead to a reduction in the cost of supply. In contrast, many of the published studies conclude that these markets are distorted by the abuse of dominant position of incumbents. However, these studies are typically based on theoretical models and tools based on a simplified representation of reality, and by ignoring critical features that constrain the ability or incentives of generators, bias the results and exaggerate the risk of abuse. This article reviews the limitations of some of these tools and, as an alternative, it suggests various indicators of market power abuse derived from the observation of the actual behavior of the generators, so as to obtain more robust and reliable conclusions about their behavior. These indicators reject the hypothesis that generators exercise market power in the Spanish electricity market.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.revista-eea.net
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Estudios de Economía Aplicada in its journal Estudios de Economía Aplicada.

    Volume (Year): 29 (2011)
    Issue (Month): (Agosto)
    Pages: 627-654

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:29_2_12

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Beatriz Rodríguez Prado. Facultad de CC.EE. y EE. Avda. Valle del Esgueva. Valladolid 47011 SPAIN
    Phone: (34) 983 423320
    Fax: (34) 983 184568
    Web page: http://www.revista-eea.net
    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information:
    Email:
    Web: http://www.revista-eea.net

    Related research

    Keywords: mercado eléctrico; competencia; poder de mercado; pivotalidad; concentración ; Electricity Markets; Competition; Market Power; Pivotality; Concentration.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Juan Toro & Natalia Fabra, 2002. "Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market," Economics Series Working Papers 136, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    2. Rotemberg, Julio J & Saloner, Garth, 1986. "A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars during Booms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 390-407, June.
    3. Allaz Blaise & Vila Jean-Luc, 1993. "Cournot Competition, Forward Markets and Efficiency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 1-16, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:29_2_12. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Beatriz Rodríguez Prado).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.