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Subexplotación y sobreexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común/Underuse and Overexploitation of Commons

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Author Info
FUENTES CASTRO, DANIEL () (Departamento de Análisis Económico. UNIVERSIDAD DE ZARAGOZA.)
Abstract

La mayor parte de la literatura que aborda la gestión de bienes en régimen de propiedad común parte del supuesto que los propietarios ejercen simultáneamente su derecho de uso. Menos atención se le ha prestado al derecho de exclusión (la propiedad sobre un bien faculta no sólo a usarlo, sino también a impedir que otros lo usen). En el primer caso es frecuente encontrar situaciones de sobreexplotación, mientras que en el segundo surge otro tipo de ineficiencia: la subexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común. Con la ayuda de un ejemplo algebraico se muestra, desde el paradigma neoclásico, que las situaciones de subexplotación y de sobreexplotación de bienes en régimen de propiedad común son en realidad ineficiencias del mercado que tienen su origen en el comportamiento de los agentes económicos, en cuestiones relativas al poder de mercado y en la presión ejercida sobre los recursos. Much of the literature on the commons focuses on the fact that many agents are assigned usage rights simultaneously, but less attention has been paid to the exercise of exclusion rights. The simultaneous exercise of one of the two rights by all the owners of a common causes a problem of overexploitation in the first case (competition “in use”) and underuse in the second (competition “in exclusion”). The relevance of both inefficiencies stems from the way they illustrate the general conflict between individual and collective interests. This paper proposes a formal synthesis of the problems of inefficiency associated with the exploitation of resources in common property regimes. The synthesis takes into account the following features: i) the importance of the consumer surplus for the analysis of the issue; ii) the attitude of economic agents in the face of a reciprocal externality linked to the exploitation of the common; and iii) the social and the private costs of exploitation.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Estudios de Economía Aplicada in its journal Estudios de Economía Aplicada.

Volume (Year): 27 (2009)
Issue (Month): (Agosto)
Pages: 577 (16 Páginas)
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Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:27_2_17

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Related research
Keywords: bienes comunes; anticomunes; sobreexplotación; subexplotación; derechos de propiedad ; commons; anticommons; overexploitation; underuse; rights of property.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-1.


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