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Racionalidad ilimitada y provisión voluntaria de bienes públicos: Imposibilidad de alcanzar soluciones endógenas/Unbounded Rationality and the Voluntary Provision of Public Goods: Impossibility to reach endogenous solutions

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  • GARCÍA-SOBRECASES, F.

    ()
    (Departamento de Economía Aplicada, Sección departamental Economía Política. Universitat de València. Campus del Tarongers, Edifici Departamental Occidental, 5A10, Avda del Tarongers s/n, 46022-Valencia. Telf.: 963 828 610)

  • MONTORO PONS, J. de D.
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    Abstract

    Este artículo revisa las condiciones a cumplir para alcanzar soluciones endógenas dirigidas a lograr niveles superiores de provisión voluntaria del bien público que nos alejen del subóptimo inicial en un marco de racionalidad ilimitada. Partiendo del modelo original de Cornes y Sandler, se describen las limitaciones de los supuestos de cooperación individual convencionales sobre los que aquél se estructura. A continuación, se establece un marco dinámico temporal en el que los individuos interaccionan para alcanzar el nivel de cooperación necesaria para resolver este problema de acción colectiva. Finalmente, la violación de la condición samuelsoniana -óptima- de equilibrio refuerza la idea de que sólo la solución exógena convencional basada en la coacción resuelve el problema a la suboptimalidad inicial, dentro del marco de racionalidad ilimitada. The aim of this paper is to analyze the conditions to be fulfilled in order to reach endogenous solutions that lead us to a higher than the initial suboptimum level of provision of public goods in an unbounded rationality framework. Cornes and Sandler’s original model is the starting point where the limitations of the conventional individual cooperation are described. Secondly, a dynamic framework is introduced in which individuals interact in order to reach the level of cooperation that solves this problem of collective action. Finally, violating the Samuelson condition for an optimum equilibrium leads us to state that in this framework, only the conventional exogenous coercive solution solves the problem of initial suboptimality.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Estudios de Economía Aplicada in its journal Estudios de Economía Aplicada.

    Volume (Year): 22 (2004)
    Issue (Month): (Agosto)
    Pages: 213-229

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    Handle: RePEc:lrk:eeaart:22_2_4

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    Related research

    Keywords: Racionalidad ilimitada; bienes públicos puros; soluciones Nash subóptimas; supuestos de cooperación; condición samuelsoniana de equilibrio.;

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    1. Johansen, Leif, 1982. " On the Status of the Nash Type of Noncooperative Equilibrium in Economic Theory," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 84(3), pages 421-41.
    2. Cornes, Richard & Sandler, Todd, 1985. "On the consistency of conjectures with public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 125-129, June.
    3. Myles, Gareth D., 1997. "Depreciation and intergenerational altruism in the private provision of public goods," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 725-738, December.
    4. Sugden, Robert, 1984. "Reciprocity: The Supply of Public Goods through Voluntary Contributions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 772-87, December.
    5. Guttman, Joel M, 1987. "A Non-Cournot Model of Voluntary Collective Action," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(213), pages 1-19, February.
    6. John Conlisk, 1996. "Why Bounded Rationality?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(2), pages 669-700, June.
    7. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
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