Estructura Organizativa de la Empresa y Disuasión a la Entrada
AbstractIn this paper we analyze the choice of how a firm organizes itself with regard to the degree of centralization of production decisions, as a way of deterring entry by the manager of the firm. We show that if the fixed cost of setting up a new firm is low enough, the owner of the firm chooses a centralized organizational form.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Departamento de Economía, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas, Universidad Nacional de La Plata in its journal Económica.
Volume (Year): IL (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January-December)
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