Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

The Political Economy of Banking Regulation – Does the Basel 3 Accord Imply a Change?


Author Info

  • Elias Bengtsson

    (Stockholm University, SE 10691 Stockholm)

Registered author(s):


    Literature on the international financial architecture suggests that financial crises have had profound effects on both the balance of power in the establishment of financial regulation, and the economic impact of regulation on countries and regulated entities. In this article, we seek to add to this knowledge by studying the process by which the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) developed its third capital accord, the so-called Basel 3 accord. We also describe changes in BCBS’s governance and standard setting process, and ask whether these may have caused the economic impact of Basel 3 to differ from the Committee’s preceding capital accords (Basel 1 and 2). Our findings indicate that while BCBS still seem to develop standards that favor their traditional member countries, large international banks no longer seem as clearly favored by its latest capital accord. And while private actors still seem to dominate the exertion of influence over the committee, the governance structure of BCBS has changed towards a more transparent and politically accountable set-up.

    Download Info

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Credit and Capital Markets in its journal Credit and Capital Markets.

    Volume (Year): 46 (2013)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 303-329

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:kuk:journl:v:46:y:2013:i:3:p:303-329

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page:

    Related research

    Keywords: Political economy; international financial architecture; Basel Committee on Banking Supervision; Basel 3; Banking regulation;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:


    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.



    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


    Access and download statistics


    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kuk:journl:v:46:y:2013:i:3:p:303-329. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Credit and Capital Markets).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.