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Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén?
[When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric information?]

Author

Listed:
  • Major, Iván

Abstract

Jól ismert tény, hogy az egyes országokban a kormányzat különböző szervezeteinek úgy kell meghozniuk és megvalósítaniuk a gazdasági fejlődést befolyásoló gazdaságpolitikai döntéseket, hogy közben korlátozott ismeretekkel rendelkeznek a gazdasági szereplők adottságairól, illetve a szereplők által kifejtett azon erőfeszítésekről, amelyekre a kormányzat ösztönözni igyekszik őket a gazdaságpolitikai célok elérése érdekében. Ezek a problémák a klasszikus megbízó-ügynök ösztönzési modellek alapesetei. A szerző elméleti megközelítésben azt vizsgálja, hogyan változik a kormány és a szereplők viselkedése, ha az aszimmetrikus információ kétoldalú: nemcsak a kormány információi hiányosak a gazdasági szereplők típusáról vagy azok erőfeszítésszintjéről, hanem a szereplők is csupán korlátozott információval rendelkeznek a kormány megbízhatóságáról. A mechanizmustervezés modelljeinek eszköztárát használva bizonyítja, hogy ilyen kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információs helyzetekben a kormány - mint megbízó - csak úgynevezett torz ösztönzésre képes: a "jókat" megbünteti, a "rosszakat" pedig megjutalmazza. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: C73, D82.

Suggested Citation

  • Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén? [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1453
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. László Csorba, 2019. "Issues and Types of Adverse Selection and Negative Selection," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 18(2), pages 87-116.
    2. Major, Iván, 2014. "Rövid megjegyzések Gömöri András "Rövid megjegyzéseihez" [Brief comments on András Gömöri s Brief Comments"]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(9), pages 1060-1064.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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