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A bizonyítási teher megfordításának hatása kártérítési ügyekben
[Reverse burden of proof in tort law]

Author

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  • Szalai, Ákos

Abstract

A magyar kártérítési jog egyik specialitása a fordított bizonyítási teher, azaz nem a károsultnak kell bizonyítania, hogy a károkozó nem az elvárható gondossággal járt el, hanem a károkozónak, hogy igen. Más országok jogrendszerében sem ismeretlen ez a szabály, de inkább csak kivételesen alkalmazzák. Talán ezért sem kapott eddig megfelelő figyelmet a joggazdaságtani (law and economics) elemzésekben. E probléma figyelmen kívül hagyása a magyar jogi környezetben megkérdőjelezhetővé teheti a kártérítési jog magyar nyelven elérhető közgazdaságtani elemzéseinek megállapításait is. Modellünk arra tesz kísérletet, hogy áttekintse ennek hatását elsősorban a potenciális károkozók elővigyázatosságára, ami a kártérítés közgazdaságtani elemzésének kiinduló kérdése. Látni fogjuk, hogy a bizonyítási teher megfordításának hatása nem egyértelmű: nem biztos, hogy a károkozók mindig elővigyázatosabbak lesznek. Megvizsgáljuk, hogy mely körülmények befolyásolják ezt a hatást: 1. mennyire türelmes a bíróság a bizonyítási eljárás során és 2. mekkora a bizonyítékszerzés relatív költsége a felek számára.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: K13, K41, C72.

Suggested Citation

  • Szalai, Ákos, 2013. "A bizonyítási teher megfordításának hatása kártérítési ügyekben [Reverse burden of proof in tort law]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1208-1233.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1422
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Chris William Sanchirico, 2012. "Evidence: Theoretical Models," Chapters, in: Chris William Sanchirico (ed.), Procedural Law and Economics, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    10. Chris William Sanchirico (ed.), 2012. "Procedural Law and Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 13092.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K13 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Tort Law and Product Liability; Forensic Economics
    • K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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