Potential and â€˜Power of a Collectivity to Actâ€™
AbstractThis paper connects two notions: Hart and Mas-Colellâ€™s â€˜potentialâ€™, related to the value of coalitional games, and Colemanâ€™s earlier notion of â€˜power of a collectivity to actâ€™, related to the easiness to make decisions by means of a voting rule. Copyright Springer 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 58 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (03)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
voting rules; potential; simple games; C71; D7;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
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