Renegotiation of Concession Contracts: A Theoretical Approach
AbstractWe construct a regulation model in which renegotiation occurs due to the imperfect enforcement of concession contracts. This enables us to provide theoretical predictions for the impact, on the probability of renegotiation of a concession, of regulatory policy, institutional features, economic shocks and of several characteristics of the concession contracts themselves. Copyright Springer 2006
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Industrial Organization.
Volume (Year): 29 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100336
Renegotiation; Concession contracts; Regulation; D7; L5; O54;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
- O54 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Latin America; Caribbean
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